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Abstract
When does Internet traffic cross international borders? This
question has major geopolitical, legal and social implica-
tions and is surprisingly difficult to answer. A critical
stumbling block is a dearth of tools that accurately map
routers traversed by Internet traffic to the countries in
which they are located. This paper presents PASSPORT:
a new approach for efficient, accurate country-level router
geolocation and a system that implements it. PASSPORT
provides location predictions with limited active measure-
ments, using machine learning to combine information from
IP geolocation databases, router hostnames, whois records,
and ping measurements. We show that PASSPORT substan-
tially outperforms existing techniques, and identify cases
where paths traverse countries with implications for security,
privacy, and performance.
1. INTRODUCTION
Determining when Internet traffic crosses international
borders is of significant interest to both lawmakers and
the general public. A nation’s laws usually apply even
to foreign traffic that transits that nation. The US, UK,
and other nations aggressively surveil traffic that crosses
their national borders [PCLOB 2014, MacAskill et al. 2013,
Farivar 2013]. Foreign traffic that traverses countries with
aggressive censorship policies can be filtered before it ar-
rives at its destination [Levis 2012]. Countries have debated
(e.g.,Brazil [Grande 2014]), or enacted (e.g.,China [Bowman et al. 2017],
Russia [Walker 2015]) “data residency” laws that require
their citizens’ data to remain on domestic soil. In Europe, the
Data Protection Directive [EU 1995, EU 2016b, EU 2016a]
forbids the movement of citizens’ data to countries that
do not provide “adequate” data protection. In the US, the
laws relating to the government’s ability to search and seize
their own citizens’ data depend on whether that data was
intercepted on US soil or abroad [Daskal 2015].
Despite increasing interest from the public, network-
ing researchers still lack the tools needed to accurately
determine where Internet traffic crosses international bor-
ders. While traceroute trivially reveals the IP addresses
of the routers traversed by network traffic, geolocating
these router IPs to countries remains a key open problem.
There are a number of commercial databases [IPInfo 2018,
MaxMind 2018b, DBIP 2018, APIgurus 2018, IP2Location 2018,
Google 2017, Akamai 2018] and research projects [Wang et al. 2011,
Padmanabhan and Subramanian 2001,Wong et al. 2007, Katz-Bassett et al. 2006,
Laki et al. 2011] that accurately geolocate IP addresses be-
longing to eyeball networks, Internet exchange points (IXPs),
and large enterprise datacenters. However, the accuracy
of these sources on routers is poor [Gharaibeh et al. 2017,
Poese et al. 2011]. We find that when mapping routers
to countries, even the best geolocation databases achieve
more than 90% accuracy for only 46.5% of the countries
traversed by paths in our traceroute dataset. Worse, naïvely
mapping router IPs to countries using BGP paths and AS-
level geolocation, has this accuracy for only 5% of coun-
tries. Research projects that rely on active measurements
can require large numbers of probes to be accurate, and
their online deployments either fail to resolve many router
locations [Laki et al. 2011, Wong et al. 2007], or is not un-
available.
To address this problem, we present PASSPORT, a system
that accurately maps router IPs to countries. PASSPORT
identifies the set of countries traversed by a traceroute
path by combining small numbers of round-trip time (RTT)
latencies with a machine learning classifier that uses IP
geolocation databases. PASSPORT first trains a machine-
learning classifier on a set of (individually inaccurate) ge-
olocation sources, and uses the classifier to map the IP in a
path to a set of countries. These results are filtered through
speed-of-light (SoL) constraints imposed by RTT latencies.
This enables PASSPORT to filter out incorrect predictions
and maps each IP to a single country 88.1% of the time.
Our main contributions are as follows.
• We build a dataset of 11,626 ground-truth router IP
geolocations from 1,244 autonomous systems (ASes) in
120 countries, and use them to evaluate the accuracy
of existing approaches for router geolocation. These
locations come from well-established data sources such
as IXP locations, crowdsourced labels from operators,
and reverse DNS entries, and they are all cross-validated.
• We design and evaluate an empirically informed ap-
proach to aggregating a suite of machine-learning clas-
sifiers for predicting a router’s country, using our ground
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truth labels for training. More specifically, we demon-
strate that it is possible to achieve high country-level
geolocation accuracy from individually inaccurate data
sources by combining independent classifiers trained on
different subsets of a possibly-biased dataset.
• We build and evaluate techniques that incorporate active
measurements and iterative learning that improve classi-
fier precision and accuracy.
• We use our system to analyze the geopolitical prop-
erties of targeted intra-country and international paths,
identifying interesting cases and their implications. For
example, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and
South Africa) nations, among others, often wish to avoid
transiting traffic through the US, where it can be subject
to surveillance. However, we find that paths between
Brazil and Russia, as well as those between China and
India, transit the US. Russia, which reportedly meddled
in recent European elections [Deen 2017, Delcker 2017],
transits traffic for several paths between European coun-
tries. Even “purely domestic” traffic detours outside of
country where sources and destinations are located, in-
cluding a case where domestic Philippines traffic transits
Hong Kong.
• In addition to providing an online tool to provide country-
level IP geolocation, we will make all of our code and
data publicly available.
2. RELATED WORK AND MOTIVATION
This section discusses prior IP geolocation work. We
exclude the use of GPS, which is now commonly accessible
when measuring from mobile devices, because such infor-
mation is generally not available for router IPs.
Constraint-based schemes. These schemes [Wang et al. 2011,
Padmanabhan and Subramanian 2001, Wong et al. 2007, Katz-Bassett et al. 2006]
primarily use speed of light (SoL) constraints based on RTT
measurements from given landmark locations to identify
regions where a router can feasibly be located. Each
approach uses some source of ground truth to further tighten
the contraints on where a host may be geolocated. Eriks-
son et al. [Eriksson et al. 2010] use RTTs and a Naive
Bayesian classifier to identify router cities and counties (not
country), but use an inaccurate geolocation database [MaxMind 2018b]
to validate their results. Posit [Eriksson et al. 2012] uses
statistical analysis on latency measurements and landmarks
to identify possible locations.
Hostname Parsing schemes. The hostnames associated
with router IPs often encode location information, e.g.,
ae-4-90.edge5.frankfurt1.level3.netencodes
the city of Frankfurt, Germany. Previous work leverages
this to provide mappings from router hostnames to their
locations via simple matching [Freedman et al. 2005] and
machine learning [Huffaker et al. 2014]. These approaches
generally provide accurate IP geolocation at the regional
level, but can be inaccurate when there is location ambiguity
(e.g., san can indicate the airport code for San Diego,
California, or the start of several cities starting with “San”
such as San Juan). Further, this technique only works
if location-encoded hostname information is available for
the IP address. The IXMap project [IXMaps 2018] uses
a combination of hostname parsing and next/previous hop
RTT latency to assign router locations.
Geolocation Databases. Several free and paid services
offer databases that map IP addresses to locations [IPInfo 2018,
MaxMind 2018b, DBIP 2018, APIgurus 2018, IP2Location 2018,
Google 2017]. However, recent work indicates that they
have limited accuracy for geolocating infrastructure IP ad-
dresses [Gharaibeh et al. 2017]. In part to address this,
OpenIPMap [NCC 2017] maintains a crowdsourced list of
router IP geolocations, but is limited to covering IPs pro-
vided by contributors. Alidade [Chandrasekaran et al. 2015]
uses a collection of databases and measurements to identify
router locations. In contrast, we develop an adaptive strategy
for incorporating unreliable information to provide reliable
predictions of the country where a router IP is located.
Geopolitical routing implications. When Internet traffic
traverses national borders, it may be subject to surveil-
lance [Regan 1981, Daskal 2015, Farivar 2013, MacAskill et al. 2013,
PCLOB 2014] and censorship regimes [Levis 2012]. As a
result, the privacy and integrity of users’ Internet traffic de-
pends not only on endpoint locations, but also on the location
of intermediate hops. In addition, large geographical detours
can turn into path inflation that substantially impacts end-to-
end performance [Krishnan et al. 2009].
Summary. Previous approaches rely on independent,
complementary approaches to geolocating IP addresses,
none of which alone has sufficient accuracy to reliably
geolocate the country where a router IP resides. As a
result, researchers are currently in the dark regarding the
import nt question of which countries Internet traffic tra-
verses. In our work, we leverage the observation that each
of these approaches has different strengths and weaknesses,
so there is an opportunity to combine them to provide
greater accuracy as a whole than any individual part. The
next section describes how we leverage this observation by
using machine learning principles to reliably predict router-
IP countries.
3. GOALS AND DESIGN
3.1 Goals
Our primary goal is to build a system that can accurately
identify the countries of Internet routers that respond to
active measurements probes (e.g., pings). Our ancillary
goals are to provide an online system that makes predictions
quickly so that it can map both transient and long-lived
paths, and to ensure that the system quickly adapts to
changes in Internet topologies that affect router-location
predictions. The system should be accurate enough to under-
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(a) Offline training.
(b) Online prediction.
Figure 1: Key system components. The offline training
module (top) builds a machine-learning classifier that
predicts router country; the online prediction module
(bottom) provides interactive prediction of router countries
for an input set of traceroute measurements.
stand the geopolitical properties of Internet paths regarding
security and privacy.
Geolocations of router IPs have received little attention
compared to “eyeball” IPs; in fact, naïve approaches to using
geolocation databases for such infrastructure IPs leads to
high inaccuracy (e.g., 29% of IP geolocations are incorrect in
our labeled dataset for MaxMind, shown in Table 3). When
looking at the accuracy on a per-country level, existing
approaches achieve 90% accuracy or better only for 5–
46.5% of countries (Figure 4). Such inaccuracy can signif-
icantly impact our ability to correctly interpret geopolitical
implications of paths traversing those routers.
Thus, instead of relying on any fixed set of geoloca-
tion data sources to predict a router location, we take
an alternative approach that relies on machine learning.
Specifically, our hypothesis is that the set of geolocation
sources that will reliably predict a router’s country varies
according to properties of the router (e.g., IP, BGP prefix,
etc.), and that we can build a machine-learning classifier
that reliably predicts router locations based on an ensemble
of individually unreliable sources. We test this hypothesis
and show that a machine-learning classifier, combined with
active measurement probes, can achieve substantially higher
accuracy and precision compared to previous approaches
(e.g., at least 90% accuracy for 96.5% of countries, as shown
in Fig. 4).
Assumptions. Our system takes as input a set of
traceroute measurements (along with round-trip times to
each responsive router) and a collection of IP geolocation
data sources. After processing this initial data, we assign
countries to each IP address1 along a path that we observe.
1Hereafter referred to simply as IP.
We assume that the errors affecting each data source are
not random and that data sources achieve high accuracy
for at least some networks. We further assume that our
ground truth IP geolocations are correct. Though we focus
on country-level geolocation, our input geolocation sources
can use finer-grained precision.
To bootstrap our traceroute-based country-level geolocation
analysis, we assume that fixed-line end-host geolocations
can be predicted accurately. We also assume that each
IP observed along a path is assigned to exactly one cor-
responding router,2 and that neither the router nor the IP
change locations substantially during each measurement and
analysis round, which is currently one day. While it is
certainly the case that IPs can be reassigned or reused
arbitrarily within an ISP, we expect it to rarely affect our
conclusions.
Non-goals. This work does not focus on geolocating
eyeball IP addresses; rather, we assume that geolocation
databases provide high accuracy for such IPs and thus use
them as “anchors” for geolocating routers. We do not map
routers to city-level (or finer-grained) locations; rather we
focus only on the country where it resides. This is sufficient
to inform several important security and privacy analyses.
We do not attempt to provide perfect accuracy or coverage
of Internet paths; however, our approach should geolocate
most Internet paths most of the time. If a router on a path
does not respond to a traceroute (or a ping) probe, then we
cannot use SoL to geolocate it; however, we can use SoL
constraints to other responding hops on the path to identify
the set of countries such absent routers might be located in.
3.2 Design
PASSPORT is designed around two high-level compo-
nents, offline training and online prediction (Figure 1). For
offline training, we begin with traceroutes, ground truth
location labels, and IP geolocation databases. We use these
as input to train a machine-learning classifier that predicts
the country where a router is located.
For online prediction, we accept as input (from a user,
or via an API call) a traceroute measurement and return
the set of countries in which each router is predicted to be
located. The result can be zero or more countries, but as
we show in § 5, we predict exactly one country for the vast
majority (88.1%) of cases. This section provides a high-level
overview of the system design; we cover implementation
details in § 4. Table 1 presents a roadmap for the remainder
of the paper.
3.2.1 Offline Training
The purpose of the offline training component of PASS-
PORT is to build a machine-learning classifier that reliably
predicts the country-level location of routers appearing in ar-
bitrary traceroute measurements. Offline training consists of
three phases (Fig. 1a): data collection, feature selection, and
2As such, we will use the terms router and IP interchangeably.
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§ Topic Dataset Key results
4.1.3 Classifier Selection Controlled exp. We develop an ensemble of 4 classifiers, trained on different subsets of labeled
data.
5.2.1 Overall Accuracy Ground truth We show that our approach is more accurate than single classifiers and
geolocation services.
5.2.3 Ensemble Construction Ground truth Adding more classifiers in the ensemble provides diminishing returns for
the increase in accuracy while increasing the number of countries predicted
(decreasing precision).
5.3 Constraint-based Refinement Traceroute IPs We increase the precision of the ensemble classifier in PASSPORT using SoL
constraints (PASSPORTmaps 88.1% IPs to a single country and 95.5% to at most
two countries).
5.5 Comparison: Alternatives Traceroute IPs PASSPORT has a high consistency with EdgeScape and IP2Location, but lower
with other geolocation databases. Most inconsistencies occur when geolocation
databases predict a country that violates SoL constraints, and these affect
accuracy for large fractions of paths.
6 Geopolitical Case Studies Traceroute IPs PASSPORT identifies many cases of international detours, reverse-forward path
asymmetry, and circuitous paths.
Table 1: Roadmap for key topics covered in §4, §5 and §6.
training and refinement. Data collection entails gathering
router IPs and RTTs from traceroutes, geolocation hints from
available (unreliable) sources, and ground truth geolocations
when available.
In the training and refinement phase, we first use ground
truth labels (§4.1.1) and features to train an initial classifier.
We then use RTTs from traceroute data to rule out any classi-
fier predictions that violate speed of light (SoL) constraints.
As a result, there may be cases where at least one router
has no predicted country. In the iterative refinement phase,
we use the geolocated routers on a path and SoL constraints
to help locate such routers. We then use the results of these
analyses to retrain the classifier. This phase terminates when
the set of predicted router locations becomes stable (e.g., no
more than 1% of router locations change from one iteration
to the next). In practice our system converges within two
or three rounds. We run this analysis periodically, currently
using a (configurable) period of one week.
Note that our design incorporates a single logical clas-
sifier, but can be (and is) composed of an ensemble of
classifiers. We refer to this single logical classifier as
ensemble. As we discuss in the next section, we use a custom
ensemble of classifiers, with each sub-classifier selected
based on empirical analysis to achieve high accuracy (see
Appendix C, to make router-country predictions.
3.2.2 Online Prediction
The online prediction component makes router-country
predictions interactively (Fig. 1b). The input to this com-
ponent is a set of traceroutes to be geolocated at the country
level. We use the classifier trained in the offline phase to
make initial predictions for router locations. Much like
the refinement phase in the offline training component, we
impose SoL constraints to identify feasible country locations
for routers. The output of online prediction is a traceroute
path labeled with router countries. See Appendix E for an
example.
4. IMPLEMENTATION
Source IPs Countries ASes
Union of all sources 11,626 120 1,244
OpenIPMap 8,973 117 1,037
Manually Labeled 2,422 58 668
IXP 231 11 7
Table 2: Ground truth IP geolocations. Our dataset covers
a substantial number of IPs worldwide.
We now discuss the implementation of each component of
the PASSPORT design.
4.1 Offline Training
The offline training component currently runs once per
week, a tunable parameter. It takes as input both ground truth
and unreliable location data, extracts features for prediction,
and uses them to build a machine-learning classifier. We now
discuss the implementation details.
4.1.1 Data Sources
We use the data below to train classifiers in PASSPORT.
We identify the location of 11,626 IP addresses, in 120
countries and 1,244 ASes (Table 2).
Reliable location data. We assume the following
datasets to be reliable and use them as ground truth. First,
we use the lists of IXP addresses and locations provided
by Packet Clearing House [House 2017]. Such prefixes and
locations are well known and tend to change rarely.
Second, we use crowdsourced labels fromOpenIPMap [NCC 2017]
gathered between May 2016 and March 2017, comprising
19,257 IP addresses. OpenIPMap is a publicly available
database that uses crowdsourcing to geolocate IP addresses,
and as such may contain incorrect labels. We used RTT
measurements from April, 2017, to throw out any infeasible
IP geolocations from OpenIPMap as well as those that were
mapped to a region spanning multiple countries. After this
filtering step, we are left with 8,973 addresses. We cross-
validated the OpenIPMap dataset and found that using it
improved our coverage (by 62 countries) and country-level
accuracy (nearly doubling the number of countries where we
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have 80% or higher accuracy) even if a significant number of
labels are incorrect. In fact, our analysis showed that even
when 10% or 20% of OpenIPMap locations are incorrect,
the accuracy of PASSPORT only decrease by 0.6% and 4.1%,
respectively. The details of this analysis are available in
Appendix A.
Selecting IPs for manual labeling. To seed our
system with useful measurement data spanning a diverse set
of commonly traversed countries and ISPs, we conducted
an initial set of traceroute measurements for the purpose
of manually labeling routers with their locations. These
measurements were conducted in February, 2017. We
selected 67 PlanetLab vantage points as sources, covering
20 countries. For each source, we picked the corresponding
country-specific Alexa Top-100 websites as destinations.
For each traceroute, we removed the endpoints and identified
the countries where each intermediate hop IP was registered
according to whois.
This set of 13,744 IPs covered a large set of countries
around the world, but there were too many to manually label.
We thus sampled the IPs using a set of heuristics to cover IPs
in distinct prefixes across a large number of ASes globally.
Specifically, we identified the top 20 largest ASes3 in each
country (in terms of the customer cone size based on CAIDA
AS Rank[CAIDA 2018a] data), then picked a destination IP
address from up to five routable prefixes in the AS.4 We did
this for the 50 countries with the largest number of whois-
registered IPs, yielding 2,653 IPv4 addresses. Of these,
231 belonged to IXPs with public locations [House 2017],
leaving 2,422 unlabeled routers (from 668 ASes) for manual
labeling.
Note that this approach was heuristically designed to
cover a set of diverse networks worldwide with a limited
amount of probes, and we do not claim to have maximized
coverage or diversity. Rather, the point of this dataset
is to provide useful initial data for training our classifier.
Approaches that improve the scale and diversity of labeled
routers should only further improve our system.
Ground truth labels. We manually labeled the location
of 2,422 IP addresses. First, we identify the country for each
unlabeled router using targeted traceroutes toward the router
from multiple vantage points (first from a set located in
different continents, then if necessary using ones in the same
continent as the unlabeled router), and incorporate geoloca-
tion data inferred from corresponding RTT-based SoL con-
straints and router hostnames. For routers with hostnames
that encode geolocation information (e.g., via city names or
airport codes) we use both DRoP [Huffaker et al. 2014] and
our own manual analysis to identify each router’s country.
3In countries with 20 or fewer ASes registered, we selected all of
the ASes.
4For ASes with fewer than five prefixes, we selected one IP for
every prefix.
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Figure 2: Top 20 countries in terms of # of routers in
the ground truth dataset. There is bias toward the US
and European countries, which we need to account for when
training classifiers.
Figure 2 shows a CDF of the fraction of IPs covered by the
top 20 countries5. Interestingly, the top 3.3% (4 out of 120)
countries cover 48.1% of the IPs. We discuss techniques to
account for this bias below.
Unreliable geolocation sources. Our input dataset
includes several unreliable geolocation sources: IP ge-
olocation services (IPInfo [IPInfo 2018], Maxmind Geo-
lite2 [MaxMind 2018b], DB-IP [DBIP 2018], APIgurus [APIgurus 2018],
IP2Location [IP2Location 2018]), hostname parsers (DDec [CAIDA 2018b],
which combinesDRoP [Huffaker et al. 2014] and undns [Freedman et al. 2005])
and AS information (whois entries andAS Rank [CAIDA 2018a]).
While geolocation services have been used as reliable
sources for end host IPs, our analysis in §5 shows that they
provide low accuracy for router IPs in our dataset. Hostname
parsers can have high accuracy for routers, but they also offer
low coverage and have false positives when hostnames are
ambiguous. whois data contains the country where an AS
or IP prefix is registered, but that often differs from where a
corresponding router is located. Next, we describe how we
extract features from these unreliable sources and use them
as input to a machine-learning classifier.
4.1.2 Feature Selection
This section describes the features we select from unreli-
able data sources for training our classifier. We summarize
the selected features and their individual accuracy for geolo-
cating routers in Table 3.
The feature we use from IP geolocation services and
hostname parsers (IPInfo [IPInfo 2018], Maxmind Geo-
lite2 [MaxMind 2018b], DB-IP [DBIP 2018], APIgurus [APIgurus 2018],
IP2Location [IP2Location 2018], and DDec [CAIDA 2018b])
is the country corresponding to the geolocation for each IP.
Further, we use the registered country/countries for each IP’s
ASN and ISP (which may own multiple ASNs) based on
whois data.
We include the size of each AS as features, under the
hypothesis that larger ISPs are more likely to span multiple
5The complete list of countries in terms of the number of routers in
the ground truth is available at https://goo.gl/umsbjz
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Information
Source
Cost Precision Selected
Features
Accu-
racy
IP address N/A N/A IP address N/A
CAIDA AS
Rank
Free N/A ISP size (# ASes),
customer cone
(# of IPs & prefixes)
N/A
WhoIS Free N/A AS: name,
number, country
67%
ISP: name, city,
region, country
69%
DDec Free City Country 83%
DB-IP Free City Country 69%
Maxmind
GeoLite2
Free Country Country 71%
APIgurus Paid City Country 70%
IP2Location Paid Country Country 81%
IP Info Paid* City Country 71%
* provided for free for our research
Table 3: Classifier features and their individual accuracy
for predicting router country. While some data sources
offer high overall accuracy, we show in Fig. 4 that this
accuracy is limited to a small number of countries that are
overrepresented in our dataset.
Classifier Accuracy(%)
Decision Tree 88.45 ± 5.11
Random Forest 84.38 ± 5.4
Extremely Randomized Trees 84.41 ± 3.91
1-Nearest Neighbor 58.19 ± 7.79
AdaBoost 32.05 ± 9.39
Linear SVM 15.83 ± 8.67
Naive Bayes 12.07 ± 5.09
Table 4: Classifier Accuracy using 10-fold cross validation.
Decision trees provide high accuracy.
countries, while smaller ones are likely to be within a single
country. We define size using the number of ASes in
each ISP, the number of IP addresses, and the number of
routable prefixes contained in an ISP’s customer cone (using
[CAIDA 2018a]).
We evaluated the feature importance (using Gini impor-
tance [Louppe et al. 2013]) of the features in determining a
router’s country, and found that IP2Location [IP2Location 2018]
was the primary determinant of the predicted country for
71.0% decisions. This was followed by the IP address
(6.70%), and country predicted by DDec [CAIDA 2018b]
(6.44%). The ordered list of features by importance is
available in Table 8 in Appendix B.
4.1.3 Classifier Selection and Training
When implementing our machine-learning approach to
predicting countries where routers are located, we identified
two key challenges: selecting the type of classifier(s) to train
and determining the information provided for training.
Classifier Selection. Our primary goal is to identify
a classifier that can provide high accuracy and precision
for predicting router country. A secondary goal is to use
a classifier that is human-interpretable so we can ascertain
why it performs well.
We evaluated all available classifiers in scikit-learn [Pedregosa et al. 2011]
to find ones with high accuracy. These include tree-based
classifiers and ensembles (e.g., Decision Trees and Random
Forest), clustering algorithms (K-Nearest Neighbors), Sup-
port Vector Machines (SVMs), Naive Bayes, and adaptive
approaches (e.g., AdaBoost) as listed in Table 4.
We evaluate accuracy on the entire labeled dataset using
10-fold cross validation; i.e., we sort the labeled data ran-
domly and evenly divide it into 10 folds (disjoint groups).
We test the accuracy of the classifier by training it on nine
folds and testing on the one that was not in the training set.
This is repeated 10 times, one for each fold to exclude from
the training dataset, and the average accuracy (as well as
standard deviation) are presented in the second column of
Table 4. We refer to such classifiers, trained on the entire
training dataset, as default classifier.
There are clear winners and losers. Decision trees and
their ensembles perform well (with similar accuracy), while
clustering approaches and AdaBoost do not. However, this
finding is potentially biased by the sample size per country
in our dataset, and may simply indicate that the classifiers do
well only for the countries with a large sample size.
To investigate this, we compare the top-performing clas-
sifiers from Table 4 in terms of the accuracy per country.
For each classifier type, we train one instance using data
from a uniformly random sample of training examples,
and a separate instance using an equal number of training
examples per country (i.e., by oversampling from countries
with few routers and undersampling from those with large
numbers of routers)6. Figure 3 shows our per-country
accuracy results. We found that Decision Trees and Random
Forests substantially outperform all other classifiers, regard-
less of sampling method (for details, see Appendix C.1).
Given that decision trees perform well and are easy to
interpret,7 we selected decision-tree based classifiers for our
implementation. Note, however, that no individual classifier
performs well for all countries. This motivates the need for
ensemble approaches as described below.
Training an ensemble of classifiers. We have estab-
lished that the training dataset used for classifiers can have
a significant impact on accuracy, particularly when there is
bias in the dataset. Thus, it is important to take these biases
into account in PASSPORT to provide high accuracy across a
wide range of countries that Internet paths may visit.
A key challenge is that we cannot know a priori how
biased our training dataset is relative to an arbitrary set of
traceroutes needing router-country predictions. Thus, in-
stead of attempting to provide a “one-size-fits-all” classifier
trained with some subset of training data, we chose to im-
plement an ensemble of classifiers, each of which is trained
6Note that we evaluate additional training dataset selection
approaches to understand classifier sensitivity in Section 5.
7As expected, we find that the decision-tree nodes encode
information about which database is most accurate for a given IP
address.
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Figure 3: Classifier Comparison. CDF of the fraction of
accurately predicted router locations per country, for each
classifier type that performed well on the overall dataset.
When training the classifiers using (a) randomly sampled
number of instances, and (b) equal number of instances in
each country, decision trees and forests provide the best per-
country accuracy.
using complementary approaches to sampling our dataset.
In this model, each classifier in the ensemble predicts router
countries independently and the ensemble returns a set that is
the union of these countries. As we discuss in the following
paragraphs, we use RTT latency with SoL constraints from
traceroute data to eliminate infeasible countries from this set.
If the set still contains more than one country, PASSPORT
can optionally return the set or report that it was unable to
isolate a single country for the router. In our evaluation, we
show that PASSPORT returns exactly one country 88.1% of
the time, and zero countries only 3.1% of the time.
Our ensemble consists of multiple classifiers.8 One classi-
fier simply uses the entire labeled dataset. For the remaining
classifiers, we train each instance using a different subset of
data to mitigate bias in the dataset. One of the classifiers
uses a fixed number of training instances per country, as we
found that doing so will reduce the impact of country-level
bias in the dataset. The remaining two classifiers are trained
using empirically derived sets of training instances. For this,
we investigate the marginal impact on accuracy from adding
individual training instances for each country. One approach
uses this to find the minimal set of training instances that
maximizes the accuracy for each country (which we refer to
as maximum accuracy). The other approach finds the point
at which adding more instances has diminishing returns on
accuracy (i.e., the second derivative of the accuracy vs.
number of instances curve is zero), which we refer to as knee
(of the curve).
SoL constraints and iterative refinement. The ensem-
ble classifier predicts one or more countries for each router.
To improve the accuracy and precision of the ensemble, we
use traceroute data in the following way.
First, we use RTT latencies associated with each tracer-
oute path that includes the targeted router, r. For each
source s in the set of sources S with a path that includes
targeted router r, we find the minimum RTT delay between
s and r. We conservatively find the distance d between
8We tested 23 classifiers, not shown due to space limitations, and
used the 4 that provide highest accuracy gain in our ensemble.
s and r using the empirically derived propagation delay
from Laki et al. (0.47c) [Laki et al. 2009], then identify the
set of permissible regions that r can be located in using
the geodesic circle cs centered at s (geolocated using a
geolocation service) with radius d. When there are paths
from multiple sources containing r, we identify the set of
permissible regions for r as bounded by the intersection of
circles cs for all s in S.
After identifying the permissible region where r may
be located, we identify the countries intersected by region.
Finally, we adjust the set of predicted countries by finding
their intersection with the permissible countries. At the end
of this step, a router is assigned to zero9 or more countries.
We incorporate two optimizations to improve coverage
and efficiency. First, we use lists of router aliases [Keys et al. 2013]
to ensure that we can intersect paths visiting different IP
addresses on the same router. Second, we ignore large
latency measurements (which lead to intersection regions
larger than a country). Namely, we use only measurements
with an RTT less than 100 milliseconds to ensure that the
diameter of cs is less than 40% of the circumference of the
earth in any direction.
For cases where the latency from r to all s in S is large
(i.e., our vantage points are far from the targeted router),
we use an iterative refinement approach as follows. Given
a path measured from s containing r, we find all landmark
routers l with IPs that can be located with high precision
(e.g., reliable geolocation sources from §4.1.1). We then
estimate the latency between l and r as 1
2
∗ |rtts−r−rtts−l|,
where rtts−r is the RTT between s and r and rtts−l is the
RTT between s and l. In other words, we assume that the
path from l back to s is the same as r back to s, and find
the average additional delay from l to r and r to l (which
is equal to or larger than the smallest unidirectional delay
on the round-trip path). Because the above path assumption
may be violated in practice, we use this approach only when
no other information is available to reliably isolate a router
country.
After this step, each router r is mapped to a permissible set
of countries (or the empty set). We use this as a new label to
retrain the ensemble classifier to improve its predictions. We
repeat the above process until the set of countries mapped to
routers stabilizes.
4.2 Online Prediction
A user submits a traceroute (or an IP address) to the
PASSPORT web server using an online submission form or
API request. PASSPORT parses the traceroute to extract
IP addresses and RTTs, then uses its classifier to predict
the countries where these IPs are located, and applies SoL
constraints to eliminate any infeasible countries. The output
is the filtered list of IP-to-country mappings. The online
9The intersection of permissible regions cs may be an empty
region, or permissible regions may not include any predicted
countries.
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system predicts each IP address to up to two countries or
returns an error for that IP address. The detailed predictions
of countries from the ensemble classifier, the list of coun-
tries filtered using SoL constraints, and a complete list of
countries predicted by PASSPORT can be accessed using the
public API.
The online prediction system, user guide, and the API are
publicly available at https://passport.ccs.neu.edu
5. EVALUATION
This section addresses key questions regarding the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of our approach. First, we conduct
microbenchmarks on our classifier design and implementa-
tion. Next, we demonstrate the advantage of incorporating
SoL constraints and iterative refinement. We then show
that our approach incurs reasonably low overhead to train
and is suitable for online prediction. Last, we compare our
approach with alternatives.
5.1 Methodology
We evaluate our classifier design and implementation us-
ing the same dataset and methodology presented in Section
4.1. This contains a set of router IP addresses for which we
have ground truth labels. To evaluate our system against IPs
not in our training dataset, we conduct additional traceroutes
(using a similar methodology) as specified in Section 5.3.
5.2 Classifier Analysis
In this section, we answer the following key questions:
• How well do simple approaches work at predicting IP
location? None is particularly accurate, especially when
considering per-country accuracy.
• Are all the unreliable geolocation sources similarly bad,
or are there cases where at least one correctly predicts
locations most of the time? Usually at least one unre-
liable source can correctly predict location, opening the
door to classifier-based prediction.
• Is any one classifier sufficient to optimize accuracy? No,
an ensemble provides the best results.
• Is the machine-learning approach both accurate and
precise? Yes, in the vast majority of cases our approach
identifies one country for a router.
The following subsections describe which ML classifiers
work best individually and how we combine them to provide
higher accuracy. All these results present average statistics
using 10-fold cross validation.
5.2.1 Overall accuracy
We start with the accuracy of our final ensemble classifier
as described in Section 4.1.3, using the labeled data from
Section 4.1.1. Accuracy is defined in terms of the fraction
of router-to-county predictions that are correct according
to ground truth labels. We exclude cases where multiple
countries are predicted.
We compare the performance of our ensemble with differ-
ent geolocation services in terms of the fraction of routers
in each country that are correctly predicted (singleton set).
This is plotted in Figure 4 using a CDF where the y-axis
represents countries and x-axis is the fraction of a country’s
routers predicted correctly. Curves closer to the bottom and
right edges indicate higher accuracy.
Our ensemble substantially outperforms all other approaches—
it achieves 90% or better accuracy for 96.5% of countries in
our dataset. By comparison, individual decision trees can
achieve the same level of per-country accuracy only for 61%
of countries. Worse, the most accurate IP geolocation ser-
vice, IP2Location achieves this only for 46.5% of countries
and whois registry information for only 5% of countries.
In terms of implications, it is clear that machine-learning
approaches are able to synthesize individually inaccurate
geolocation sources to more reliably predict router geolo-
cations. Further, the accuracy for IP geolocation ser-
vices and whois data do not extend beyond a small frac-
tion of countries, meaning any conclusions about geopo-
litical properties of Internet paths using such data (e.g.,
[Edmundson et al. 2016, Shah et al. 2016]) are highly likely
to be incorrect.
5.2.2 Microbenchmarks and Classifier Sensitivity
We now investigate the individual components of our en-
semble classifier and their sensitivity to the training dataset.
For each country, we select the number of training instances
that either (1) providemaximum per-country accuracy (max-
imum accuracy), or (2) at the point where increasing in-
stances provide diminishing returns in accuracy (knee), as
discussed in §4.1.3.
The outcome depends on how we allocate training in-
stances to other countries, so we investigate three schemes
using three schemes: using the same number of samples
for other countries as in the target country (balanced),
double the instances in other countries as in the target
country(unbalanced), and a random number of samples for
other countries (random).
Overall, we find that random performs systematically
worse, while maximum accuracy and knee approaches on
both balanced and unbalanced sampling methods yield
similar results. The details on how we select training
instances to achieve high accuracy are further described in
Appendix C.2.
5.2.3 Ensemble Construction
In Section 4.1.3, we described several techniques for
training classifiers in addition to the default classifier. We
now investigate how to combine these classifiers to optimize
for accuracy and precision.
Figure 5 shows the change in accuracy for all size-n sets
of classifiers with the number of classifiers in the set (x-axis)
against the average increase in the accuracy (y-axis) and the
number of countries predicted by the set of classifiers (y2-
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light (SoL) constaints. By incor-
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infeasible router locations, then using
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88.1% of the time, compared to the
initial classifier that does so only 63.7%
of the time.
axis). The figure shows a diminishing return on accuracy
improvement as more classifiers are added. At x = 3,
the increase in average accuracy is roughly 1.1% while it
decreases to 0.3% for x = 4 and beyond this point the
increase in accuracy is negligible.
We pick the first 4 classifiers to form our ensemble clas-
sifier. It contains default, balanced dataset bias with knee
sampling approach, unbalanced with maximum accuracy
approach, and one classifier with equal number of training
instances for all countries.
5.2.4 Precision
A key question is whether the high accuracy in the
ensemble classifier is due to one correct country being
predicted for a router, or rather that the correct country is
one of a large set of countries returned. To evaluate the
precision, we computed the distinct number of countries and
continents returned by the classifier for each router in our
dataset. The ensemble predicts a single country for 65.7% of
router IPs, while it predicts a single continent for 82.4% of
router IPs (see Appendix C.4). Thus, the ensemble alone
is accurate but not precise; further, due to the spread in
continents predicted, this precision is not sufficient to reason
about geopolitical implications of Internet paths. In the
next section, we demonstrate how we use SoL constraints
to improve precision such that the vast majority of the time
(88.1% of IPs) a router is predicted to be located in one
country.
5.3 Constraint-based Refinement
In this section, we discuss how we use RTT latencies
measured from traceroute paths to substantially improve the
precision of the ensemble classifier. Specifically, we use SoL
constraints as described in Section 4.1.3 to rule out infeasible
countries from the set predicted by the ensemble classifier.
Further, we leverage these observations to train a classifier
on the subset of feasible countries predicted by the ensemble
to improve precision for routers without sufficiently narrow
SoL constraints imposed by RTT latency.
Dataset. To analyze the impact of SoL constraints, we
need a large set of traceroute data fromwhich we can impose
substantial numbers of constraints. We thus conducted an
additionalmeasurement campaign as follows. We performed
forward traceroutes and reverse traceroutes [Katz-Bassett et al. 2010]
in April, 2017 from 172 PlanetLab nodes in 32 countries
to up to four government websites for 190 countries10
(generating 30,248 and 10,477 successful traceroutes for
forward and reverse traceroutes, respectively). To add
diversity in terms of sources and destinations, we also used
442,862 traceroutes (311,684UDP and 131,178 ICMP) from
RIPE Atlas from 9,553 probes in 176 countries during the
same period. These measurements yielded at least two
intersecting regions for SoL analysis for 63% of routers.
The following paragraphs compare the precision of sev-
eral schemes for using SoL constraints.11 First, we compare
the precision of our ensemble classifier to that of SoL
constraints alone, then evaluate the combination of the two
techniques. Since SoL constraints can offer additional
ground truth labels (e.g., by ruling out predicted countries
or reinforcing correct predictions), we further evaluate the
impact of retraining our classifiers with the combined in-
formation. We plot a histogram summarizing our precision
results in Figure 6, with each bar indicating the fraction
of router IPs (y-axis) that are predicted to be located in x
countries.
Precision of SoL constraints. The leftmost two
bars indicate the precision for the ensemble classifier and
SoL constraints. We find that SoL constraints predict
10We used fewer than four websites if we could not locate four.
The limit of four was set due to API limitations by unreliable
geolocation sources
11Due to lack of ground truth in this dataset, we cannot evaluate
accuracy.
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Figure 7: System performance. Training time is reasonably
low and increases linearly with the number of training
instances; the online prediction component returns more
than 1200 predictions in less than 300ms.
substantially fewer countries than the ensemble, but neither
predicts a single country more than 64% of the time. The
combination of these two approaches (“Ensemble + SoL”
bar), where we use SoL constraints to identify which of
the predicted countries is feasible, substantially improves
precision with almost all of the routers predicted to be
located in 1–2 countries.
Iterative refinement using classifier retraining. To
further improve precision, we leverage two cases from the
previous analysis to retrain our classifier: instances where
the SoL constraints identified exactly one country for router
(11,308 addresses spanning 110 countries), and instances
where the ensemble classifier was incorrect. We retrain
the ensemble classifier, and using the combination of SoL
constraints and the predicted countries by this retrained
ensemble, plotted “Retrained Ensemble + SoL”. This step
substantially improves precision, with 79.4% of routers be-
ing located to a single country and only 5.3% of predictions
containing more than one country.
The last optimization for precision incorporates cases
where the ensemble predicted multiple countries while the
SoL constraints predicted only one country and there was no
intersection between the two (showing that the ensemblewas
incorrect in predicting countries). In this case, we can ignore
the classifiers and only use the SoL constraints to predict the
country. This is depicted as the rightmost “PASSPORT” bar
in Figure 6. Putting it all together, our final classifier is able
to predict exactly one country for a router 88.1% of the time.
5.4 Efficiency
We now evaluate PASSPORT in terms of time to train the
classifiers in the offline component and time to predict in
the online component.12 All experiments used a 4-core i7
processor (4.2 GHz) with 16GB of RAM.
Figure 7a plots the time required to train our classifier (y-
axis) as a function of the number of training instances (x-
axis), both for the ensemble classifier and for an individual
decision tree. The graph shows that an individual classifier
can be trained with 100,000 instances in approximately
50 seconds. When looking at training the ensemble of 4
12We do not include the variable times necessary to conduct active
measurements, though they are on the order of seconds.
classifiers used in our system, we find that training time
takes approximately 4.8 seconds when trained in parallel
(for a combined set of 31,603 instances). Thus, re-training
classifiers in the offline phase is not a bottleneck in our
system, and if necessary, retraining can be done on the scale
of 10s of seconds.
For the online prediction component, we expect users to
submit traceroutes and obtain the corresponding countries on
the path interactively (i.e., within a small number of seconds
or less). Figure 7b plots the response time as a function
of the number of parallel requests for predictions where
measurements are available. The plot shows that under
low load the system can make predictions within 10s of
milliseconds, serve 350 parallel requests in less than 100ms
and can serve up to 2,000 parallel requests in less than half
a second. Thus, PASSPORT is sufficiently fast to provide
interactive predictions for traceroutes.
5.5 Comparison with Alternatives
We now compare our approach with geolocations pro-
vided by other commonly used services. Unlike the analysis
in §5.2, we use the dataset described in §5.3, which is larger
but does not have ground truth labels for router locations.
GeolocationDatabases While comparing public databases,
instead of determining whether each service is accurate,
we evaluate other approaches in terms of whether they
are consistent with PASSPORT results for the cases where
exactly one country is predicted. While we cannot guarantee
that all these cases are accurate, we have high confidence in
them due to SoL constraints and classifier predictions.
Table 5 presents the results for several geolocation ser-
vices.13 We find that all of the geolocation sources yield
locations that are inconsistent with our data (including SoL
constraints), ranging from 7.3–21.5% of routers in our
dataset for April 2017. We found that this number increases
to 9.1–23.1% for the same geolocation services with data
from June 2016 (not shown), indicating that using slightly
older geolocation databases (as is the case for Maxmind
GeoIP2 [MaxMind 2018a] and IPligence [IPligence 2017])
yields similar results.
We evaluate the impact of these inconsistencies when it
comes to mapping traceroutes to country-level paths and
find that a substantial fraction (37.4–66.7%) of paths are
affected. We find that 0.1–14% of the inconsistencies occur
due to SoL violations, and thus are not only inconsistent but
incorrect.
We found several patterns behind the observed SoL vi-
olations. IPInfo [IPInfo 2018] returns EU as a country for
42% of their SoL violations (instead of a single country),
while Maxmind [MaxMind 2018b] incorrectly returns either
13We attempted to compare with
Alidade [Chandrasekaran et al. 2015], but the service was not
running at the time of writing. The authors instead provided us
with locations provided by Alidade’s geolocation services, which
are included in the table.
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Switzerland or Sweden for 48% of the violations. Similarly,
IP2Location [IP2Location 2018], and EdgeScape [Akamai 2018]
return United States as the most commonly mislabeled
country, corresponding to 22% and 11% of incorrect cases,
respectively. IPligence fails to predict a country for over
27% of violations.
For cases where PASSPORT and other databases were
inconsistent, we sampled and analyzed a subset of cases
for manual analysis. In the vast majority of cases, we find
that PASSPORT is correct. We sampled and labeled 596
IP addresses from 519 ASes in 146 countries in a manner
similar to §4.1.1. Our results showed that PASSPORT had
the highest accuracy with 96.47% IP addresses being labeled
correctly, followed by IP2Location at 92.3% and Edgescape
at 90.9%. PASSPORT outperformed other sources in all
continents except Europe, where Edgescape had the highest
accuracy (95.35%, vs. 93.4% for PASSPORT). Appendix D
provides an in-depth comparison of the geolocation sources
with PASSPORT.
Comparison with active measurement systems. A key
advantage of PASSPORT is that it can accurately geolocate
router countries with few (or no) additional measurements
beyond a traceroute. To demonstrate this, we investi-
gated the number of vantage points required to issue ping
measurements to determine whether a predicted country is
feasible according to SoL constraints. We explored a greedy
approach (use VPs with the lowest RTT to a router) and a
random approach (select VPs randomly).
Both approaches are highly efficient at acheiving high
precision. When using a greedy approach, one VP provides
the same result as using all VPs. The random approach,
which requires no a priori knowledge, can predict 87.41% of
routers to a single country (compared to the optimal 88.1%
in Fig. 6). Further, at most 6 randomly selected VPs are as
good as using all of them.
By comparison, Wang et al. [Wang et al. 2011] and other
geolocation approaches that use active measurements [Eriksson et al. 2012,
Wong et al. 2007] perform measurements from all avail-
able VPs (see Eriksson et al. [Eriksson et al. 2012], which
evaluates such approaches using a minimum of 25 VPs).
Wong et al. [Wong et al. 2007] found that Octant can locate
80% of target addresses using only 10 VPs, but this is
still an order of magnitude larger than our approach. In
short, PASSPORT provides high accuracy without needing a
large distributed set of vantage points or large numbers of
measurements, thus reducing the barrier to deployment.
6. CASE STUDIES
We now use PASSPORT and the dataset of §5.3, to study
paths with interesting properties. We focus on detours—
paths that traverse at least one country that is not the source
or destination country. Paths that start and end in the same
country (e.g., Canada) but detour through another (e.g.,
the US) are especially interesting, because such “purely
domestic traffic” is subject to the surveillance and censorship
Source SoL Viol.
(%)
Inconsistent
IPs (%)
Affected
Paths (%)
EdgeScape 0.1 7.6 37.4
IP2Location 1.4 7.3 31.2
DB-IP 6.4 14.7 60.5
Maxmind
GeoIP2*
10.0 21.2 64.3
Maxmind
GeoLite2
13.5 21.1 64.1
IP Info 14.0 21.5 65.6
IPligence* 13.2 23.1 66.7
Table 5: Comparison with other approaches. While many
geolocation databases are highly consistent with PASSPORT,
their inconsistencies affect large fractions of paths in our
dataset. Further, several databases exhibit SoL violations for
a substantial fraction of IPs in our datatset; we know in these
cases that the databases are incorrect. * from June 2016
Source Dest. Interesting
Detours
Cases (Detours/ To-
tal Traceroutes)
BR RU US, FR, DE 12 / 12
PH PH HK 1 / 12
CA CA US 23 / 457
CZ CZ PL 24 / 132
LV FR RU 2 / 11
AM BG, LU RU 8 / 20
CN LB, SA US, UK, FR 12 / 12
CN SG, IN US 326 / 326
CN QA US, FR 8 / 8
SG, JP, CN PK US, FR 22 / 22
SG CN, PH US 5 / 5
PH PK, LK US, UK 5 / 5
PH CN, TH US 11 / 11
PH LB FR 9 / 9
TW TH US 3 / 3
GH MW UK, FR 312 / 312
GH TN UK 58 / 58
ZA RE UK, FR 17 / 17
AR, JP RE US, FR 11 / 11
NZ RE BR, US, FR 7 / 7
Table 6: Interesting Cases. Path starting and ending in
Asia/Africa detour through the US and/or EU. Paths starting
and ending in the EU detour throughRussia. Some Canadian
paths detours the US, a Philippines path detours through
Hong Kong, and paths starting and ending in Oceania take a
circuitous trip around the globe.
regime in the detoured country. We are also interested in
paths that transit multiple continents. Table 6 lists sources,
destinations, detour countries for several paths in our dataset.
Each path described in Table 6 has been manually validated
using hostnames, pings from multiple vantage points, and
review of RTTs between hops and next-hop location. We
discuss the a few of these paths in more detail below.
BRICS. Around late 2014, the BRICS countries (Brazil,
Russia, India, China, and South Africa) were reportedly
planning to build a undersea fiber cable that would intercon-
nect them, while avoiding the US and Europe [Lee 2017].
Thus far, however, this effort has come to nought. In our
dataset, all the traceroutes from Brazil to Russia transited
through the United States and France. We also saw US
detours in all paths from China to India.
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Russia. Paths that start and end in Europe but de-
tour through Russia are interesting, given reports of poten-
tial Russian meddling in European elections [Deen 2017,
Delcker 2017]. That said, Russia is home to one of the
world’s largest IXPs (MSK-IX) [MSK-IX 2018], which could
explain why we saw several detours from within the EU to
Russia. Some of the paths between Latvia and France are
carried by a Russian Telecom company through Russia. In
addition, a set of the paths between Armenia and Luxem-
bourg or Bulgaria travel through Russia.
Asia to the US. We identified several cases where traffic
originating and terminating in different Asian countries
detours to the US. In fact, we found detours to the US
in all the traceroutes in our dataset from China to its
neighbors (India, Pakistan, and Philippines) and from China
to the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Qatar).
This is significant because foreign communications that
transit the US are subject to warrantless surveillance under
Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) [PCLOB 2014].
Canada to the US. We identified a path that started and
ended in Canada, and took a detour through the US, corrobo-
rating evidence provided by the IXmaps project [IXMaps 2018].
The US intelligence community recognizes Canadian cit-
izens as “second party" persons, and thus requires some
additional approval (beyond the standard FISA Section 702
authorizations) before they can be “targeted” for surveil-
lance [Nakashima and Soltani 2014].
Phillipines to Hong Kong on the reverse path. One
particularly interesting path started and ended in the Philip-
pines; while its forward path stayed inside the Phillipines,
its reverse path passed through Hong Kong. This path high-
lights the importance of using reverse traceroute [Katz-Bassett et al. 2010]
to measure international detours.
Long paths. Some of the longest (geographically)
paths we observed were between Oceania and Africa. For
example, we found a path originating in New Zealand
that traversed Brazil, the US, France, and then eventually
arriving at the destination in Reunion Island. We also
found detours through the US, UK, and France for traffic
originating and terminating in different African countries.
The inflated paths between African countries was initially
reported by Gupta et al. [Gupta et al. 2014], and tends to
result from poor connectivity at regional IXPs.
US traffic transiting abroad. Of particular interest
are cases where traffic starting and ending the US transits
through a foreign country, because US surveillance law ap-
plies fewer restraints when American’s Internet traffic inter-
cepted abroad, rather than inside the US [Arnbak and Goldberg 2015].
Our dataset, however, suggests that such cases are rare. We
did find some cases (7 out of 32,609 traceroutes) where a
traceroute might have exited and entered the United States
via a Level 3 router in Toronto. However, the router labeled
as Toronto was unresponsive to probes upon validation and
so we cannot confirm this finding.
7. DISCUSSION
Generalizability. We used a large set of traceroute
measurements to inform the design, implementation, and
evaluation of our system. However, our results apply
necessarily only to the data that we collected. We believe
that our results will be favorable for other datasets using
similar vantage points; however, we cannot make claims
about howwell it will perform in networks and countries that
were not in our dataset. Our classifiers were limited by the
ground truth labels made available to them, and we expect
that additional labels will improve our results.
Caveats for machine learning. We used relatively
simple machine-learning classifiers in large part due to their
already-high accuracy, but it is possible that more advanced
techniques would improve the system. An advantage to
our decision-tree-based approach is that one can inspect
the trees to determine whether the classifier is learning
something intrinsic to data sources. Such analysis can
provide confidence in the ability to perform well when
provided with different labeled data.
Improving datasets. We focused on country-level router
geolocation for unidirectional paths based on single snap-
shots of paths between source/destination pairs. As part of
ongoing work, we are investigating how geopolitical proper-
ties of paths change over time. We will incorporate real-time
BGP feeds to investigate suspicious transient geographic
detours. We will also expand the set of measured paths to
provide greater coverage. Finally, we will investigate how to
include crowdsourced data from our online PASSPORT tool.
Implications. We highlighted a number of scenarios of
“interesting” paths in terms of the countries they traversed
and whether they were inflated. In many of these cases, it is
possible that this behavior is normal and even intentional.
While we tried to highlight cases that we thought were
poignant, in general we leave such decisions to individuals
with sufficient knowledge to draw strong conclusions about
implications.
Certain stakeholders may wish to avoid undesirable paths.
We will investigate how to use the PEERING testbed [Schlinker et al. 2014]
to make BGP announcements that cause routes to avoid
certain countries.
8. CONCLUSION
This paper showed that one can reliably predict the
countries visited by routers along a traceroute path using
collection of unreliable geolocation sources, when paired
with speed-of-light constraints and machine learning. We
designed and built a system, PASSPORT, that does this,
and demonstrated that it is accurate, precise, and efficient
enough to provide information for submitted traceroutes
interactively. We showed that its accuracy is substantially
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better than standard geolocation sources. We also used our
system to evaluate the implications of the geopolitical paths
our system identifies, revealing potential security, privacy,
and performance issues.
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APPENDIX
A. OPENIPMAP ANALYSIS
We evaluated the accuracy of OpenIPMap [NCC 2017]
before considering it as a source of reliable data for training
our classifier, because this data source uses crowdsourced
labels that are not independently validated (outside of this
study). As a first step in the analysis, we removed the IP
addresses with wrongly labeled countries from OpenIPMap
that violated SoL constraints. Then we performed a two-
fold analysis to evaluate the accuracy of classifiers with and
without OpenIPMap. Our results show that using filtered
OpenIPMap data when training a Decision Tree classifier
improves accuracy, even if a significant fraction of labels are
wrong.
A.1 Data Sources
We use the two data sources as described in Section 4.1.1.
These data sources are as follows.
Reliable Sources/Manually Labeled. These are the IP
addresses that we manually labelled using traceroutes and
ping measurements, hostname entries, and IP prefixes to
responsive routers, as shown in Table 2. This includes IXP
locations.
OpenIPMap. These are the IP addresses that were
collected from OpenIPMap [NCC 2017] and validated using
SoL constraints, as shown in Table 2.
Entire Dataset. This dataset is a union of our reliable
data and OpenIPMap datasets, as shown in Table 2.
A.2 Evaluation
To evaluate the effect of using OpenIPMap [NCC 2017]
as our ground truth, we looked at two aspects of the dataset;
poisoning the reliable data, and evaluating the accuracy of
this reliably labeled dataset using OpenIPMap. Our overall
results show that using OpenIPMap as training data has a net
effect of improving accuracy and coverage compared to not
using it.
A.2.1 Poisoning
To understand the effect of incorrect labels provided by
OpenIPMap, we evaluate the resilience of our classifier and
its ability to correctly predict the true country despite given
wrong training labels.
We take our manually labeled dataset (reliable data) and
“poison” different percentages of the data by randomly as-
signing an incorrect label. Then use 10-fold cross validation
on each corresponding Decision Tree classifier to identify
how the poisoned data impacts accuracy.
We evaluate four categories of predictions; i) where
classifier was able to predict the correct country despite
being provided with a wrong label, ii) where classifier
predicted to the poisoned country (for the routers where it
was poisoned and the true label where it was not poisoned),
iii) where the predicted country was neither the true country
nor the poisoned country and, iv) where classifier was unable
to predict any country and suggested an "unknown country"
label.
Figure 8 shows the effect of poisoning on the reliable data
for all four categories mentioned. With 10% of the labels
being incorrect, the accuracy decreased by 0.6% while with
20% the data being poisoned, the accuracy decreases by
4.1%. Even when the 40% of the dataset is poisoned, the
accuracy of the classifier remains well above 80% showing
that our classifiers are resilient to reasonably low levels of
incorrect labels.
A.2.2 Accuracy Analysis for Training on Datasets
To further understand the affect of OpenIPMap on the
accuracy, we evaluated the accuracy of the classifier with
and without OpenIPMap. We evaluate the accuracy of
the classifiers by training the classifiers using reliable data,
OpenIPMap, and the aggregation of both OpenIPMap and
manually labeled dataset. We then evaluate them and test
the accuracy of the prediction for the reliable data.
We used 10-fold cross validation (where training and test-
ing datasets were the same) with a Decision Tree classifier
to evaluate the accuracy.
Table 7 shows that when our reliable dataset is tested on
the all the other datasets, the difference in accuracy due to
different training dataset is low. The second row shows
that when using both OpenIPMap and reliable labels, the
accuracy difference compared to using only reliable data
(first row) is statistically small—within a standard deviation.
We also investigate other combinations of training and
testing datasets (last three rows) for completeness.
Not only is the difference in accuracy low when including
OpenIPMap, the resulting coverage in terms of per-country
accuracy is substantially better. Figure 9 shows the CDF
of the country-level accuracy when we tested the accuracy
of reliable dataset by training the classifier on reliable data,
OpenIPMap, and the entire dataset. OpenIPMap, despite
having the lowest overall accuracy in Table 7 outperforms
other training datasets (curve to the bottom right), closely
followed by the entire dataset. When trained on OpenIPMap
and entire dataset, the classifier was able to predict 73%
and 72% countries with at least 80% accuracy, respectively,
while this accuracy level is achieved only for 39% of the
countries when the classifier was trained on the reliable data.
The Table 7 and Figure 9 show that using the entire
dataset rather than reliable data alone provides higher per-
country accuracy with an insignificant decrease in the over-
all accuracy.
We also investigated the accuracy of OpenIPMap when
trained on our reliable data, but omit the results because a
significant number of countries in the OpenIPMap dataset
are not included in the training dataset.
B. FEATURE IMPORTANCE
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Figure 8: Poisoning the dataset When 10% of reliable
dataset is poisoned only, the overall accuracy decrease is
only 0.6% (less than half of a standard deviation) showing
that our classifiers are resilient to poisoning and can filter
out incorrect labels during the training phase.
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Figure 9: Country-level accuracy of the classifier when
it was trained on the reliable (manually labeled) dataset,
OpenIPMap, and the entire dataset (OpenIPMap and
manually labeled) and then tested using the manually labeled
only. OpenIPMap has the best country-level accuracy while
using manually labeled data alone decreases the per-country
accuracy for the dataset.
In a Decision Tree classifier, different features have differ-
ent weights associated with them. One feature is, sometimes,
preferred over another to make the decision.
To understand the effect of all the features on the classi-
fiers, and identify the most important ones in deciding the
country label by our classifier, we perform feature selection
analysis on the default classifier.
We train the classifier on our ground truth training dataset
and then analyze the assigned weights. We do not enforce
Training Data Testing Data Accuracy (%)
Reliable Data Reliable Data 88.91± 1.56
Entire Dataset Reliable Data 87.46± 0.93
OpenIPMap Reliable Data 83.39± 0.99
Entire Dataset Entire Dataset 88.45± 1.01
OpenIPMap OpenIPMap 87.32± 0.69
Table 7: Accuracy for different training-testing datasets
with 10-fold cross validation. The decrease in accuracy is
relatively insignificant when the we compare the accuracy
of testing the manually labeled data set trained on manually
labeled data against training on the entire dataset.
Feature Importance (%)
IP2Location Country 71.00
IP address 6.70
DDec Country 6.44
DB-IP Country 5.00
ISP Name 4.26
IPInfo Country 1.83
AS Country 0.90
IP Prefix 0.76
AS Name 0.83
ISP Country 0.46
EurekAPI 0.42
Maxmind GeoLite 0.41
AS Number 0.23
AS Registry 0.22
ISP size (# ASes) 0.17
ISP customer cone 0.17
ISP city 0.09
ISP Region 0.08
Table 8: Feature importance for all features in the default
classifier (with all labeled data) in the ensemble. The country
predicted by IP2Location is the most important feature in the
classifier predictions.
any weights and let the classifier decide the power of each
feature.
Table 8 summarizes the importance of each feature for
the default (all labeled data) classifier. Our results show
that IP2Location is the primary feature used by the classifier
decide a country label, with IP2Location being the primary
decision factor for 71% of the rules in the classifier. The IP
address and DDec [CAIDA 2018b] each contribute to 6.7%
and and 6.4%, respectively. The reason for low contribution
by DDec is because the hostnames are available for only
7% of routers in our dataset. The feature importance for
balanced with maximum accuracy sampling approach and
unbalanced with knee-based sampling approach was similar
but not identical to the default classifier, whereas, for the
classifier trained with equal number of training instances
per country, the percentage was less skewed (in favor of any
17
specific source) giving higher weights to ISP Country and
ISP size.
C. ENSEMBLE CLASSIFIER
This section provides supplementary details of decisions
behind the construction of ensemble classifier, details on the
sensitivity analysis of the classifiers, the reasoning behind
the design decisions involved in the construction of the
ensemble and the evaluation of the precision of the ensemble.
C.1 Classifier Selection
A simple statistic of the overall classifier accuracy in
Table 4 is potentially biased by the number of samples per
country in our dataset and is not necessarily instructive of
whether the classifier offers high accuracy across a wide
range of countries.
To investigate this, we compare the top-performing clas-
sifiers from Table 4 by training them with data by randomly
sampling training data from our dataset.14 We then find the
accuracy of each classifier according to the fraction of a
country’s routers that are predicted correctly. We plot this in
Figure 3a as a CDF of accuracy per country, where the x-axis
represents accuracy and y-axis is the fraction of countries
with router locations predicted correctly at least x% of the
time.
For x = 0.9, the figure shows that Decision Tree and
Random Forest achieves an accuracy of 90% or better for
35% of the countries. The 1-Nearest Neighbor algorithm
achieves the same level of accuracy for only 3% of the
countries and AdaBoost never achieves 90% accuracy.
Figure 3a shows that all the classifiers fail to predict 23%
of the countries. In our dataset, these countries are the ones
that have only one or two training instances.
To study the impact of bias, we plot Figure 3b, with the
axes similar to Figure 3a, as a CDF of accuracy per country
by using an equal number of training examples per country
(i.e., by oversampling from countries with few routers and
undersampling from those with large numbers of routers).
Decision Trees and Random Forests still outperform other
classifiers, achieving an accuracy of 90% or better for 76%
of the countries. However, we also found that accuracy
decreased for certain countries compared to the default clas-
sifier, thus a single classifier does not necessarily perform
well for all countries.
C.2 Microbenchmarks and Classifier Sensi-
tivity
We investigate the effectiveness of the individual compo-
nents of our ensemble classifier and their sensitivity to the
training dataset under different data sampling techniques.
We focus on the empirically derived number of training
instances for a country that provide maximum per-country
accuracy (maximum accuracy) and diminishing returns for
14Note that we evaluate additional training dataset selection
approaches to understand classifier sensitivity in Section 5.
increasing number of training instances (knee) approach
from Section 4.1.3.
First, we investigate the number of instances required
to achieve a per-country accuracy of 60% and 90%. The
outcome depends on how we allocate training instances to
other countries, so we investigate three schemes: using the
same number of samples as in the target country (balanced),
double the instances in other countries (unbalanced), and a
random number of samples (random).
Figure 10 shows the minimum number of training in-
stances required to achieve a given per-country accuracy
level (x-axis), as a CDF over all countries in our dataset
(y-axis). Unsurprisingly, lower accuracy thresholds require
fewer training instances. Focusing on the 90% accuracy
threshold, about two thirds of countries need eight or fewer
training instances. This is encouraging because providing
ground truth labels is a time-consuming, manual process for
many router IPs. Note, however, that there is a long tail to
the graph, indicating that some countries, like United States,
France, Germany and Russia, need large numbers (hundreds
or thousands) of instances to achieve high accuracy.
We now evaluate our strategies for automatically selecting
the best instances to use for training. Recall from Sec-
tion 4.1.3 that we incorporate two schemes: maximizing per-
country accuracy (maximum accuracy) and finding the point
of diminishing returns for accuracy improvement (knee).
Figure 11 shows the per-country accuracy for each approach
using a CDF of the per-country accuracy (x-axis) over all
countries in our dataset (y-axis). Overall, we find that
random performs systematically worse (not shown), while
maximum accuracy and knee approaches on both balanced
and unbalanced sampling methods yield similar results.
C.3 Ensemble Construction
In constructing the ensemble, we investigate how to
combine the classifiers to optimize between accuracy and
precision.
Figure 11 shows the approaches to achieve a maximum
gain in the accuracy per country, however, it hides the over-
lap for the predicted countries between different approaches.
We now analyze the impact of adding each of these
classifiers along with the classifiers trained using the same
number of instances, to a classifier trained on the entire
training dataset (i.e., the default classifier).
We plot a figure similar to Figure 6 to evaluate this (not
shown). Our study found that at least 6 classifiers with equal
number of training instances for each country are required
to achieve convergence in the marginal increase in overall
accuracy, while keeping the average number of countries
predicted to a minimum, as more classifiers are added to the
default classifier. These classifiers are trained using mean of
the number of training instances per country in the dataset,
since for our dataset, the mean is a better representative to
have a significant number of training instances as compared
to the median or the mod.
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Figure 10: Decision tree sensitivity to
number of training instances. More
than two thirds of countries require a
small number of instances to achieve
90% accuracy, but some require 100s of
instances to achieve high accuracy.
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Figure 12: Precision. PASSPORT is
precise in that the total number of
countries and continents mapped by the
ensemble classifier for each unique IP
address tends to be one most of the time.
We evaluate candidates for the ensemble by combining
i) 6 classifiers trained using different subsets with equal
number of instances per country, ii) all 4 classifiers from
Figure 11 and, iii) default classifier. This gave us a total of
11 classifiers.
To find the the minimum number of classifiers to achieve
convergence in the increase in accuracy, we make n-length
combinations of using all the sets of classifiers (all 11
classifiers).
As seen in Figure 5, we achieve diminishing returns in
the accuracy as accuracy more classifiers are added. At x =
3, the increase in average accuracy is roughly 1.1% while
it decreases to 0.3% for x = 4 and beyond this point the
increase in accuracy is negligible.
We pick the first 4 classifiers to form our ensemble clas-
sifier. It contains default, balanced dataset bias with knee
sampling approach, unbalanced with maximum accuracy
approach, and one classifier with equal number of training
instances for all countries.
C.4 Precision
To evaluate the question of precision of our ensemble
classifier, we plot the distinct number of countries and
continents returned by the classifier for each router in our
dataset, using a CDF in Figure 12. A point in each curve
represents the fraction of IP addresses (y-axis) for which at
least x countries were predicted (x-axis).
The graph shows that a single country is predicted for
65.7% of router IPs, while a single continent is predicted for
82.4% of router IPs. Thus, the ensemble alone is accurate but
not precise; further, due to the spread in continents predicted,
this precision is not sufficient to reason about geopolitical
implications of Internet paths.
D. ACCURACY COMPARISON WITH GE-
OLOCATION SOURCES
This section expands on our analysis at the end of Sec-
tion 5.5. We sampled and labeled the inconsistent locations
Source Accuracy (%)
Passport 96.47
EdgeScape 90.93
IP2Location 92.28
DB-IP 86.41
Maxmind GeoLite2 85.07
Maxmind GeopIP2* 81.88
IPInfo 84.39
IPLigence* 81.38
Table 9: Accuracy of PASSPORT as compared to other
geolocation sources. PASSPORT outperforms all other
geolocation sources for the labeled data. * from June 2016
between PASSPORT and geolocation services in a manner
similar to Section 4.1.1. Of the 80 inconsistent locations
between PASSPORT and EdgeScape, PASSPORT was correct
for 60 of those, while EdgeScape was correct for 18, and
both were wrong for 2 of those locations. Similarly, of the
54 inconsistencies with IP2Location labeled across 41 coun-
tries, PASSPORT was correct for 39 of those, IP2Location
for 13, and none of them for 2 locations. For Maxmind-
GeoLite2 database, of the 78 labels across 54 countries,
PASSPORT successful for 65 and Maxmind for only 10
cases with both being wrong for 3 cases. As for DB-IP,
86 instances of inconsistent locations for 56 countries was
labeled, PASSPORT correctly located 68 cases while DB-IP
was successful for only 11 cases. IPInfo showed similar
results as DB-IP as 78 out of 97 labeled inconsistencies were
correctly predicted by PASSPORT while IPInfo was correct
for only 10 cases.
When all the inconsistent labels were fed PASSPORT, it
was able learn and predict 3 more consistent cases with
EdgeScape, 2 more for IP2Location, DB-IP and Maxmind-
GeoLite 2 and 1 more case for IPInfo.
To further establish a better understanding of PASSPORT
accuracy when compared to other geolocation sources, we
manually label 596 IP addresses across 519 ASes and 146
19
countries (and independent territories) in a manner similar to
Section 4.1.1, except we chose 1 IP address per AS instead
of 5. We used these labels and found the accuracy of all the
geolocation sources including PASSPORT.
Table 9 summarizes the results showing that PASSPORT
had the highest accuracy with 96.47% IP addresses being
labeled correctly, followed by IP2Location at 92.28% and
Edgescape at 90.90%.
The results showed that our diversity of probes in different
countries allowed us to locate 4.02% routers correctly where
all other geolocation sources failed to predict the correct
country. Moreover, for 1.51% cases, atleast one of the
geolocation sources was correct while PASSPORT failed to
predict the correct location.
Of all incorrect by predictions by EdgeScape, it defaulted
and provided United States as the predicted country for
3.02% of the cases (one-third of failed cases). No patterns
were found for other geolocation sources.
Looking at the continent-level accuracy, PASSPORT had
highest accuracy for all continents except Europe. EdgeScape
had the highest for Europewith EdgeScape predicting 95.35%
routers correctly and PASSPORT being correct for 93.4%
cases
We analyzed DDec [CAIDA 2018b] as well. The DDec-
interpretable hostname information was available for only
8% of the routers. Of the routers where hostname country
was available, PASSPORT had a consistency of 99.8% with
DDec interpretations.
We intended to include NetAcquity as a comparison
point; however, the company would not offer us access
to their database at a reasonable price without publication
restrictions, which we refused to accept on principle.
E. ONLINE SYSTEM
PASSPORT system is publicly available for use via a web
interface and a REST API. The user interface developer
documentation, and the source code, are also public at
https://passport.ccs.neu.edu
Figure 13 shows a snapshot of the output result from the
website of PASSPORT for a sample traceroute measurement.
While the web interface provides a visual representation
of the countries visited for a traceroute (or an IP address),
the API is more powerful and has the ability to provide
predictions individual results by ensemble, the SoL system,
and the overall PASSPORT prediction.
When a traceroute is provided to website or the API of
PASSPORT, it’s parsed for valid router IP addresses and
their corresponding RTT measurements, as shown in Figure
1b. Using the IP address, the location predictions from
geolocation services is collected and this information is
used to predict a set of countries by the classifier. The IP
address is used to issue new ping measurements from our
vantage points. These are combined with the user-provided
measurements to construct the SoL constraints for the router
Figure 13: Traceroute performed by PASSPORT. The
web interface provides a green circle for hops for all the
hops that were located, while a yellow one representation
ongoing measurement for the router and red one shows
private addresses and system failures (with reasoning). For
countries, the blue circles represent the source and the
destination, while the map shows a visualization of the
countries traversed in a path.
location. The classifier predictions are then evaluated using
these SoL constraints and result is returned.
All this information is also stored for offline analysis and
caching is performed at each step to speed up future queries
with a flexible cache duration.
Since PASSPORT incorporates access to some external
rate-limited APIs and shared measurement vantage points,
new requests in the PASSPORT core (online system) use a
job scheduler.
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